The Thirst for Population Control: Water Hookup Moratoria and the Duty to Augment Supply by Golden, Richard M.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 27 | Issue 3 Article 7
1-1976
The Thirst for Population Control: Water Hookup
Moratoria and the Duty to Augment Supply
Richard M. Golden
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard M. Golden, The Thirst for Population Control: Water Hookup Moratoria and the Duty to Augment Supply, 27 Hastings L.J. 753
(1976).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol27/iss3/7
THE THIRST FOR POPULATION CONTROL: WATER
HOOKUP MORATORIA AND THE DUTY
TO AUGMENT SUPPLY
Introduction
The California Water Code permits a water distributor to refuse to
connect new hookups during periods of water shortage.1 Such a refusal,
commonly called a water hookup moratorium, has the effect of immedi-
ately stopping any new housing development. Thus, it is a means by
which a community can effectively implement a "no-growth" policy
without heeding the elaborate procedural and constitutional restraints
which would normally inhibit the institution of such a policy.2
Recently, voters in Main County3 defeated a bond proposal to
finance improvements which would have increased the supply in their
water system. Without these improvements, the water distributor per-
ceived a threat of a water shortage if growth continued unabated and
therefore declared a water hookup moratorium.4 A moratorium was also
declared in Santa Barbara County.5 Several landowners for whom prop-
1. CAL. WATER CODE § 350 (West 1971).
2. Cf. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir.
1975), rev'g 375 F. Supp. 574 (N.D. Cal. 1974). Procedures for the adoption
of land use regulations are set forth in the California Constitution and the Government
Code. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7; CAL. GOV'T CODE H§ 65800-912 (West 1966 &
Supp. 1975) (state zoning law). Alternatively, California cities are authorized to adopt
charters which entitle them to establish their own procedures for the enactment and en-
forcement of all ordinances and regulations in respect to municipal affairs. See CAL.
CoNsT. art. XI, § 3, 5. Generally, the state zoning law does not apply to chartered
cities unless they adopt it. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 65803 (West 1966). Certain pro-
visions of this law, however, are specifically made applicable to chartered cities. See,
e.g., id. § 65804 (West Supp. 1975).
3. The vote in Marin County was a district vote. The Marin Municipal Water
District, however, comprises ten of the eleven cities in Main County and contains ap-
proximately 85% of the county's population. Telephone interview with Tom Thorner,
Counsel to the Main Municipal Water District, Oct. 29, 1975.
4. Marin Municipal Water District, Cal., Ordinance 121, June 7, 1973, supersed-
ing Interim Ordinance 120, Apr. 30, 1973.
5. Goleta County Water District, Cal., Ordinance 72-2, Dec. 21, 1972, supersed-
ing Ordinance 72-1, Dec. 7, 1972. The moratorium in Santa Barbara primarily concerns
the Goleta County Water District, which is only one of five small water districts, each
of which serves a separate geographic area within the Santa Barbara coastal area. Each
of these five entities purchases the majority of its water supply from the same federally-
owned lake in the Santa Ynez Mountains immediately north of Santa Barbara. The
federal government sells the water to Santa Barbara County, from which the various
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erty development thereby became impossible brought suits attacking
these moratoria. 6 In Santa Barbara County, the water distributor suc-
ceeded in having one case dismissed, 7 had demurrers sustained in two
cases,8 and prevailed on the merits in a fourth suit.9 In a pair of cases,
the trial court in Main County held that the moratorium was not
authorized under the Water Code because the water shortage involved
was at the time merely threatened."0 Both of these suits are now being
water districts make their purchases. The amount of water which the county can obtain
from the federal government for use by the districts has reached the limit specified by
contract and dictated by engineering concepts of safe yield.
A similar situation exists with respect to the State Water Project. The State of Cal-
ifornia has a contract to construct an aqueduct to deliver water to Santa Barbara County
if the county elects to purchase it. That contract and the election to purchase may be
exercised only by the county and are matters over which the various local water districts
have no legal or political control. It is clear that to build the necessary facilities to
obtain the water locally, massive local bond issues would have to be placed before the
county voters. It is currently speculated that owing to the taxpayers' revolt and environ-
mental considerations, the bond issues would fail; therefore, the county has decided to
postpone the matter. In the meantime, the county is negotiating with the state and with
counties in the San Joaquin Valley in an attempt to sell its water rights to those areas,
at least on a temporary basis. Letter from Robert E. Goodwin, Counsel to the Goleta
County Water District, to Richard M. Golden, Apr. 10, 1975.
6. See, e.g., Cathedral Oaks Village Associates v. Martinez, Civil No. 74-2589R
(C.D. Cal., Nov. 18, 1974); Pomatto v. Goleta County Water Dist., No. 101404 (Santa
Barbara, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Oct. 26, 1973); Richardson Bay Apartments v. Marin
Municipal Water Dist., No. 70234 (Main County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 27, 1975);
Cathedral Oaks Village Associates v. Goleta County Water Dist., No. 104545 (Santa
Barbara, Cal. Super. Ct., Mar. 7, 1975); Cathedral Oaks Village Associates v. Goleta
County Water Dist., No. 103881 (Santa Barbara, Cal. Super. Ct., Jan. 8, 1975); Swan-
son v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 67962 (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct., July
26, 1974, amended, Aug. 19, 1974, Sept. 27, 1974); McCarthy Co. v. Manin Municipal
Water Dist., No. 66519 (Main County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974).
7. Cathedral Oaks Village Associates v. Martinez, Civil No. 74-2589R (C.D.
Cal., Nov. 18, 1974) (oral dismissal of action against individual directors of the Goleta
County Water District for alleged violations of plaintiffs' civil rights).
8. Notice of Intended Ruling on Demurrer and Motion to Strike, Apr. 11, 1974,
Pomatto v. Goleta County Water Dist., No. 101404 (Santa Barbara, Cal Super. Ct.,
filed Oct. 26, 1973) (demurrer to complaint challenging water hookup moratorium sus-
tained without prejudice); Cathedral Oaks Village Associates v. Goleta County Water
Dist., No. 104545 (Santa Barbara, Cal. Super. Ct., Mar. 7, 1975) (inverse condemnation
action dismissed without leave to amend).
9. Cathedral Oaks Village Associates v. Goleta County Water Dist., No. 103881
(Santa Barbara, Cal. Super. Ct., Jan. 8, 1975) (no vested right to water).
10. Swanson v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 67962 (Marin County, Cal.
Super. Ct., July 26, 1974, amended, Aug. 19, 1974, Sept. 27, 1974) (water hookup mora-
torium arbitrary and discriminatory); McCarthy Co. v. Main Municipal Water Dist.,
No. 66519 (Main County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974) (water hookup moratorium
arbitrary and discriminatory).
The Swanson case was decided by the same judge who decided McCarthy, and the
decisions are similar in all pertinent aspects. The findings of fact and conclusions of
law which were filed with the judgment in Swanson on July 26, 1974 were superseded,
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appealed,1 and a third case awaits final decision in the Matin County
Superior Court.12 It is the purpose of this note to analyze relevant
portions of the Water Code to determine when and for how long a water
moratorium may be imposed.'" It will be argued that the Water Code
contains an implicit duty to augment the water supply, unless the supply
will be naturally replenished, 4 and that a court should order a distribu-
tor to make a good faith effort to augment its supply before it permits a
water hookup moratorium to continue. 15 A "good faith effort to aug-
ment" will be defined to require that the distributor exhaust all its
statutory powers, including the power to conserve water by rationing,
during periods of a declared water shortage emergency.' 6 If a water
shortage emergency still exists after a distributor has made a good faith
effort to augment its supply by methods which include rationing, a water
hookup moratorium may properly continue as long as the shortage
persists.' 7 Since at that point the water supply will be unable to support
population growth, land development must cease.
This note will suggest a three-step analysis of water hookup mora-
toria. The first step will involve scrutiny of the statutes which authorize
a distributor to declare a water hookup moratorium.' 8 The inquiry will
focus on the conditions which must exist before a moratorium may be
declared and the permissible duration of a moratorium once it has been
declared. Next, it will be argued that a duty to augment the water supply
is implicit in the applicable statutes and that therefore a water morato-
rium cannot continue to exist unless this duty has been satisfied.' 9
Satisfaction of the duty encompasses an exhaustion of all statutory
powers, including the conservation of water by the imposition of water
however, by findings of fact and conclusions of law filed August 19, 1974. The conclu-
sions of law were further amended by a stipulation of the parties which was filed on
September 27, 1974. Owing to the confusion engendered by this multiplicity of docu-
ments, the propositions stated in both McCarthy and Swanson are cited only to Mc-
Carthy.
11. McCarthy Co. v. Maria Municipal Water Dist., Nos. 38139, 38140 (Cal.
Ct. App., 1st Dist., filed Dec. 11, 1975); Swanson v. Maria Municipal Water Dist.,
No. 36316 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., filed Jan. 20, 1975).
12. Richardson Bay Apartments v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 70234
(Matin County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 27, 1975). The court has issued a minute
order of intended decision which, in all pertinent parts, is in accord with the decisions
rendered in McCarthy and Swanson. See Minute Order of Intended Decision, Oct. 30,
1975, Richardson Bay Apartments v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 70234 (Marin
County, Cal. Super. Ct., filed Aug. 27, 1975).
13. See notes 22-67 & accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 60-67 & accompanying text infra.
15. See notes 68-69 & accompanying text infra.
16. See notes 86-109 & accompanying text infra.
17. See note 110 & accompanying text infra.
18. See notes 22-67 & accompanying text infra.
19. See notes 68-93 & accompanying text infra.
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rationing. 20 The concluding section of this note will integrate the forego-
ing discussion into an analytical model to guide courts in determining
the validity of any particular water hookup moratorium.2'
Statutory Authorization To Declare a Water
Hookup Moratorium
The division of the California Water Code22 which describes the
state's general powers over water contains a chapter 23 relating to water
shortage emergencies. It is this chapter which empowers distributors2 to
20. See notes 94-109 & accompanying text infra.
21. See notes 111-115 & accompanying text infra.
22. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 100-464 (West 1971 & Supp. 1975).
23. Id. §§ 350-58.
24. There are four major types of water distributors in California: special purpose
districts, municipally-owned water systems, private water companies, and public utilities.
Special purpose districts are agencies of the state with only such revocable power
as is conferred upon them by the legislature. In re Madera Irrigation Dist., 92 Cal.
296, 319, 28 P. 272, 277 (1891). Special purpose districts have been delegated broad
powers to obtain and distribute water supplies. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 22075-
78, 22425-37, 22455-58 (West 1956 & Supp. 1975) (irrigation districts); id. §§ 31020-
22, 31040-50 (county water districts); id. §§ 71610, 71690-94 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975)
(municipal water districts). Nevertheless, special purpose districts have not been dele-
gated police power; therefore, they cannot make zoning and planning decisions. See
Gilgert v. Stockton Port Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 384, 60 P.2d 846 (1936), disapproved on other
grounds, San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal. 3d 205, 216, 529
P.2d 570, 577, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 153 (1974).
A municipally-owned water system is owned and operated by the municipality itself.
It may be established under the municipality's power to provide water for its inhabitants.
See CAL. GOV'T CODE H 38730, 38742 (West 1968). Since the municipally-owned
water system is but an aspect of the municipality itself it may be able to implement zon-
ing and planning decisions which have been properly enacted by the municipality while
exercising its police power functions. See Note, Control of the Timing and Location
of Government Utility Extensions, 26 STAN. L. REV. 945 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Control of Government Utility Extensions]; Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1222 (1956). See
notes 58 & 76 infra.
Private water companies are generally distinguishable from other types of water dis-
tributors in that 1) they are privately-owned and 2) they serve only their own sharehold-
ers. If a private water company holds itself out, either impliedly or expressly, as serving
the public or begins serving persons other than its own shareholders, it becomes a pub-
lic utility subject to regulation by the Public Utilities Commission. See generally Rus-
sell, Mutual Water Companies in California, 12 S. CAL. L. REV. 155 (1939).
A public utility is a privately-owned company which provides service to the public.
Public utilities are regulated by the Public Utilities Commission, the purpose of which
is to protect the public interest while permitting the utility to earn reasonable profits.
Unlike a special purpose district, a public utility does not have the power to tax or assess
the land within its territory. Rather, a public utility's sole source of revenue is user
charges. For a general discussion of California water law, see H. RoGEas & A. NICH-
OLs, WATER FOR CALIFORNIA (1967).
Substantial confusion has been created by the failure of attorneys and commentators
to distinguish among the powers and authorities of the various types of water distribu-
tors. See, e.g., Brief for Respondent at 18-19, Swanson v. Marin Municipal Water Dis-
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impose hookup moratoria during declared water shortages. The provi-
sions authorizing moratoria apply to all types of water distributors,
regardless of whether such distributors are publicly or privately
owned.2 5
When a Moratorium May Be Declared
Water Code section 356 specifically permits a water distributor to
deny applications for new or additional service connections26 if, in the
trict, No. 36316 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., filed Jan. 20, 1975) (stating the issue
in terms of whether a water company may deny new service connections, and quoting
a case which stated that a municipally-owned water system cannot discriminate in pro-
viding service, in a suit against a water district); Note, Battle of the Heavyweights: In
This Cormer Environmental Rights and In The Far Corner Free Travel Rights, 1 HAST.
CONST. L.Q. 153, 156 (1974) (incorrectly stating that a county water district serves as
an instrument of the county administration). But see Opening Brief for Appellant at
34, Swanson v. Main Municipal Water Dist., No. 36316 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist.,
filed Jan. 20, 1975) (incorrectly citing to the Water Code rather than the Public Utili-
ties Code certain sections which deal with water companies but correctly noting that
such sections are not controlling in a suit against a water district); Control of Govern-
ment Utility Extensions, supra, at 946 n.8 (discretion that may be exercised by a munici-
pally-owned utility may not apply to other types of distributors).
Despite the significant differences among the types of water distributors, this note
will argue that Division One of the California Water Code applies to all distributors
and that therefore all distributors have a duty to augment and conserve their supplies
during periods of water shortage. See notes 68-110 & accompanying text infra. But
Cf. CAL. WATmR CODE § 367 (West 1971) (distributors subject to regulation by the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission must secure the approval of the Commission before promulgat-
ing regulations restricting water use).
25. CAL. WATER CODE § 350 (West 1971). A distributor subject to regulation by
the California Public Utilities Commission, however, must obtain approval by the com-
mission before invoking restrictions on water use. Id. § 357. In addition to Division
One, General State Powers Over Water, the statutes which create each type of water
distributor grant such distributor the power to restrict water use. See, e.g., CAL. WATER
CoDE § 31026 (West 1956) (county water districts); id. § 71640 (West 1966) (munici-
pal water districts); CAL. Pun. UTL. CODE H9 2708, 2710-11 (West 1956) (public utili-
ties). These additional grants of power may supplement the powers granted in Division
One, and they should be closely analyzed in any given case. See notes 48-50 & accom-
panying text infra.
26. Generally speaking, a water distributor is under a public trust to furnish water
to all inhabitants of the area for whose benefit it has been created. See Russell v. Se-
bastian, 233 U.S. 195, 208-09 (1914); Leavitt v. Lassen Irrigation Co., 157 Cal. 82, 89,
106 P. 404, 407 (1909); Arcade County Water Dist. v. Arcade Fire Dist., 6 Cal. App.
3d 232, 238, 85 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740 (1970). A person's right to use public water is
in the nature of a public right possessed by reason of his status as a member of the
class for whose benefit the water is appropriated or dedicated. All who enter the class
may demand the use of the water, regardless of whether or not they have previously
enjoyed it. Leavitt v. Lassen Irrigation Co., 157 Cal. 82, 90, 106 P. 404, 407 (1909).
Thus, the individual may compel the water distributor to extend its mains and do all
other acts necessary to provide service. See Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 169
Cal. 318, 332, 146 P. 640, 645-46 (1915).
Nonetheless, the right of an inhabitant of the water distributor's territory to compel
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sound discretion of the distributor, such action is necessary to conserve
the water supply for the greatest public benefit during the period of a
declared water shortage emergency.17 A water shortage emergency may
be declared by a water distributor after notice2" and a hearing29 "when-
ever it finds and determines that the ordinary demands and require-
ments of water consumers cannot be satisfied without depleting the
water supply of the distributor to the extent that there would be insuffi-
cient water for human consumption. .. ."0
The finding that an emergency exists and any resulting restriction
on water use are subject to judicial review and will be overturned if the
court finds the distributor's actions fraudulent, arbitrary, or capricious.
Although it appears that the statutes grant discretion to the water
distributor to declare a water shortage emergency, the trial court in
Main County, the only court to interpret these statutes, 32 concluded
the water distributor to serve him is not an absolute or unqualified right. Id. In addi-
tion to paying the legal rate for water use and agreeing to abide by the reasonable rules
and regulations of the water distributor, the inhabitant must make a "reasonable de-
mand" for service. Id. at 332-33, 146 P. at 646. See also Leavitt v. Lassen Irrigation
Co., 157 Cal. 82, 106 P. 404 (1909) (user must pay user charges); Boies & Soul6 v.
East Bay Municipal Util. Dist., 186 Cal. App. 2d 843, 9 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1960) (user
must abide by rules). The reasonableness of the demand must necessarily be determined
as a question of fact in each particular case. Nevertheless, it can be said that the dis-
tributor is not required to extend its mains at its own expense if the rates charged for
water delivery would only slightly compensate the distributor for the expense incurred
and there is no certainty that there would be a continuous consumption of water or a
continuous payment of rates after the water service was provided. See, e.g., Marr v.
City of Glendale, 40 Cal. App. 748, 181 P. 671 (1919). See generally Control of Gov-
ernment Utility Extensions, supra note 24.
In the older cases this issue was raised when an individual or small group of indi-
viduals decided to inhabit an otherwise isolated portion of a water distributor's territory.
See, e.g., Marr v. City of Glendale, 40 Cal. App. 748, 181 P. 671 (1919). In more
modern cases this issue is likely to arise when a developer builds a large subdivision in
an isolated portion of a water distributor's territory. Despite the fact that a large num-
ber of potential users is involved, the water distributor is not required to expend large
sums of money to extend its service if such expenditure would be based solely on the
speculation that the proposed subdivision will be successful. See Reid Dev. Corp. v.
Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 31 N.J. Super. 459, 464, 107 A.2d 20, 23 (1954);
Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1222 (1956). See generally Control of Government Utility Ex-
tensions, supra note 24.
On the other hand, if extending a main only a few feet would supply water service,
the demand for the water would obviously be reasonable, as the rates to be charged
would ordinarily compensate the distributor for the expenses incurred. Compare
Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 169 Cal. App. 318, 321-22, 146 P. 640, 641
(1915) with Marr v. City of Glendale, 40 Cal. App. 748, 181 P. 671 (1919).
27. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 350, 353, 356 (West 1971).
28. Id. § 352.
29. Id. § 351.
30. Id. § 350.
31. Id. § 358.
32. Only one other decision has addressed this issue, and the court in that case
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differently. In McCarthy Co. v. Marin Municipal Water District3 3 and
Swanson v. Matin Municipal Water District,34 the Matin County court
held that a threatened water shortage is insufficient to permit the water
distributor to declare a water shortage emergency. 35 Rather, the court
stated that an emergency shortage condition can exist only when:
(1) There is complete outage on a short or long-term basis,
or
(2) The District's system is over-committed and facing
consecutive dry cycle years, or
(3) The Districts system is over-committed and experienc-
ing a dry cycle or,
(4) The water storage is below the ... emergency level.36
Having found that none of these conditions existed,37 the court
concluded that there was no reasonable basis for the district to declare
the existence of an actual water shortage emergency condition and that
therefore the district was not authorized to prohibit connections for
future consumers. The district's imposition of this unauthorized restric-
tion was held arbitrary and discriminatory.38 The court clearly found
that a "threatened" water shortage existed,39 but it held this condition
insufficient to invoke the moratorium authority under the emergency
powers section of the Water Code.40 According to the court's interpreta-
tion of the provisions, only an "actual" water shortage emergency would
justify declaring a moratorium.4 1 As the water district's appellate brief
did not interpret these Water Code provisions. See notes 6-10 supra. A final decision
has not been rendered in the Richardson Bay Apartments case. See note 12 supra.
33. No. 66519 (Manin County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974).
34. No. 67962 (Matin County, Cal. Super. Ct., July 26, 1974, amended, Aug. 19,
1974, Sept. 27, 1974). See note 10 supra.
35. McCarthy Co. v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 66519, at 11-12 (Marin
County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974); accord, Swanson v. Marin Municipal Water
Dist., No. 67962 (Matin County, Cal. Super. Ct., July 26, 1974, amended, Aug. 19,
1974, Sept. 27, 1974); Minute Order of Intended Decision, Oct. 30, 1975, Richardson
Bay Apartments v. Matin Municipal Water Dist., No. 70234, at 3 (Marin County, Cal.
Super. Ct., filed Aug. 27, 1975).
36. McCarthy Co. v. Matin Municipal Water Dist., No. 66519, at 9-10 (Marin
County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974).
37. Id. at 11.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 12.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 11. The Santa Barbara County court has indicated that it may adopt
a contrary conclusion. In its intended ruling on a demurrer and motion to strike the
court said: 'There can be no doubt that the district has the power to restrict the use
of water during any emergency caused by drought or other threatened or existing water
shortage." Notice of Intended Ruling on Demurrer and Motion to Strike, Apr. 11, 1974,
Pomatto v. Goleta County Water Dist., No. 101404 (Santa Barbara, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Oct. 26, 1973) (emphasis added).
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in Swanson42 cogently demonstrated, this conclusion is justified neither
by logic nor by the language of the code sections. Four distinct reasons
justify the assertion that a shortage emergency condition should be
deemed to include both threatened and actual water shortages.
First, the Main County court's view is contrary to common sense,
since generally any water shortage, unless caused by some catastrophe
such as a burst dam, is merely "threatened" when first perceived. The
statute itself seems to adopt this point of view. The provision specifies
that a public hearing,4 3 preceded by at least seven days' notice, 44 is a
prerequisite to the declaration of a water shortage emergency. Since
water is an absolutely essential commodity for the proper maintenance
of health, sanitation, and fire protection, the delay in decisionmaking
caused by the requirements of notice and a public hearing would be
entirely unreasonable if the distributor had to wait until the water
shortage was "actual" before it could proceed. Thus, only in the case of
a threatened water shortage could the distributor reasonably be required
to hold a public hearing. This conclusion is consistent with the statute's
requirement that a public hearing be held in all cases except those in
which the breakage or failure of a dam, pump, or pipe line causes an
"immediate emergency. ' 45 Thus, unless an "actual" emergency is not
the same as an "immediate" emergency, it appears that contrary to the
holding of the Marin County court, a threatened water shortage is
precisely the condition for which the normal public hearing procedure
for declaration of an emergency was designed.
Second, the court's interpretation would inhibit the planning
process by preventing a water distributor from acting until its consumers
were faced with an immediate lack of water, instead of encouraging it to
exercise its planning abilities by anticipating such shortage and proceed-
ing accordingly. This inhibition of planning is reflected in the court's
specification that an emergency exists when an overcommitted water
system faces consecutive dry cycle years. While this language suggests
that a system could recognize an impending dry cycle and take precau-
tions, a dry cycle is in fact impossible to predict.46 Thus even under this
apparently broad language, preventive action is precluded.
Third, section 350 of the Water Code, which deals with the decla-
ration of a water shortage emergency condition,4 7 does not distinguish
42. Opening Brief for Appellant at 19-24, Swanson v. Marin Municipal Water
Dist., No. 36316 (Cal. Ct. App., 1st Dist., filed Jan. 20, 1975).
43. CAL. WATER CODE § 351 (West 1971).
44. Id. § 352.
45. Id. § 351.
46. See N. Blonder, Case Study: The Marin Municipal Water District's Morato-
rium on the Granting of New Water Services, at 5-11, May 1974 (unpublished memo-
randum on file with N. Blonder, P.O. Box 53, Mill Valley, Cal.).
47. Section 350 provides: "The governing body of a distributor of a public water
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between "actual" and "threatened" water shortages. Nevertheless, the
court apparently concluded that since the word "threatened" was ex-
pressly used in section 71640 of the Water Code, which specifically
applies to municipal water districts such as the defendant in the case,
that section should provide the exclusive remedy in instances of a
threatened water shortage.48 Section 71640 of the Water Code provides:
A [municipal water district] may restrict the use of district water
during any emergency caused by drought, or other threatened or
existing water shortage, and may prohibit the wastage of district
water or the use of district water during such periods for any pur-
pose other than household uses or such other restricted uses -as the
district determines to be necessary. A district may also prohibit
use of district water during such periods for specific uses which it
finds to be nonessential.49
The Matin court interpreted the phrase "restrict the use of district
water," which, in itself, might authorize the imposition of a water
hookup moratorium, to authorize the district merely "to adopt regula-
tions to prohibit wastage of water for other than household purposes and
other uses as the defendant District determined to be necessary."'5
Of importance to the current discussion is whether section 71640
actually distinguishes between a threatened and an existing water short-
age as the two conditions relate to the existence of an emergency. A
close reading of this code section leads to a conclusion contrary to that
reached by the trial court. Section 71640 permits the district to restrict
the use of district water during any emergency. The section explicitly
recognizes that an emergency may be caused by "drought, or other
threatened or existing water shortage." 51 A threatened shortage, then, is
one form of a water shortage emergency, and an existing shortage is
another. Since section 71640 deals solely with emergencies, of which it
supply, whether publicly or privately owned and including a mutual water company, may
declare a water shortage emergency condition to prevail within the area served by such
distributor whenever it finds and determines that the ordinary demands and requirements
of water consumers cannot be satisfied without depleting the water supply of the dis-
tributor to the extent that there would be insufficient water for human consumption, san-
itation, and fire protection." CAL. WATER CODE § 350 (West 1971).
48. See McCarthy v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 66519, at 11-12 (Maria
County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974). The intended decision in the Richardson Bay
Apartments case states that a "threatened water shortage falls within Water Code 71640
and not Water Code Section 350." Minute Order of Intended Decision, Oct. 30, 1975,
Richardson Bay Apartments v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 70234, at 3 (Marin
County, Cal. Super. CL, filed Aug. 27, 1975).
49. CAL. WATER CODE § 71640 (West 1966) (emphasis added). See also id. §
31026 (West 1956) (almost identical language pertaining to county water districts).
50. McCarthy Co. v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 66519, at 12 (Marin
County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974).
51. CAL. WATER CODE § 71640 (West 1966) (emphasis added).
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defines a threatened shortage as one variety, it should be read with the
emergency provisions which begin with section 350. 52
Finally, section 350 permits the distributor to declare a water
shortage emergency "whenever it finds and determines that the ordinary
demands and requirements of water consumers cannot be satisfied
without depleting the water supply of the distributor to the extent that
there would be insufficient water for human consumption, sanitation,
and fire protection.153 The use of "would be" is significant, as it refers
to a future time. 54 The statute refers to more than an "actual" outage.
Rather, it provides that an emergency condition may be declared if
supplying water to meet the demands of today will deplete the water
supply so that there may be insufficient water at some point in the
future.
Thus, it is suggested that an "emergency shortage condition"
should be defined to encompass both "actual" and "threatened" short-
ages. Using this definition, the better interpretation of the water shortage
emergency sections55 contained in Division One of the Water Code is
that a water distributor can declare a water shortage emergency condi-
tion to exist regardless of whether such shortage is deemed to be
"threatened" or "existing." Furthermore, upon declaring the existence of
a water shortage emergency of either type, the distributor can promul-
gate necessary regulations for and restrictions on water use, including
the denial of applications for new or additional service connections
during the period of the shortage.5 6 These regulations and restrictions,
including any moratorium on water hookups, are subject to judicial
review and can be overturned upon a showing that the water distributor
abused its discretion. 57
Duration of a Water Moratorium
The duration of a water hookup moratorium is a critical issue
52. Cf. Laureano v. Christensen, 18 Cal. App. 3d 515, 521, 95 Cal. Rptr. 872,
876 (1971) (the several separate provisions of a statute should be harmonized and
treated insofar as possible as one statute). But cf. SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S.
453 (1969). The Court in National Securities stated: "the same words may take on
a different coloration in different sections of the securities laws...." Id. at 466.
53. CAL. WATER CODE § 350 (West 1971) (emphasis added).
54. In addition, the duration statute provides that a water hookup moratorium may
exist until the supply has been "replenished or augmented." Id. § 355. The former
term refers to a depleted supply and the latter refers to a supply which is not yet de-
pleted but which requires augmentation because it cannot meet an increase in demand
without becoming depleted. Thus, the duration statute would seem to anticipate a water
hookup moratorium as a possible result of both a threatened and an existing water short-
age.
55. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 350-58 (West 1971).
56. See id. §§ 353, 356.
57. See id. § 358.
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because a moratorium that is allowed to continue indefinitely would be,
in effect, an implementation of a "no-growth" policy. Generally speak-
ing, water distributors are not given any powers in the fields of zoning,
land use regulation, or population control.66 Any prohibition on use of
water to effectuate directly or indirectly such nonexistent powers would
therefore be invalid.59
Section 355 of the Water Code sets the standard for how long a
water hookup moratorium can last by tying it to the duration of the
water shortage emergency. It provides:
The regulations und restrictions shall thereafter be and remain in
full force and effect during the period of -the emergency and until
the supply of water available for distribution within such area has
been replentished or augmented. 60
By definition, the term "emergency" implies an unexpected, urgent
condition."' It indicates a temporary state of affairs.6 2 This sense of the
temporary nature of the emergency ordinances is emphasized by the
statute's use of the word "until," which fixes a point at which the
emergency ordinance will cease.6" The point referred to in the statute is
the time at which the supply has been "replenished or augmented." 6
"Replenish," from the Latin word "re" (again) and "plenus" (full),
means literally to fill again, to fill up. It necessarily implies exhaustion,
reduction or diminution,6" conditions which would occur in a year of
subnormal rainfall. Thus, if the distributor restricts the connection of
new water hookups during a water shortage emergency caused by sub-
normal rainfall, the statute allows the restriction to remain in force until
normal rainfall returns and the water supply is replenished.
If, on the other hand, the water shortage emergency is caused by an
increase in demand due to increased per capita consumption or popula-
tion growth, the ordinance restricting new water hookups may remain in
58. Municipally-owned water systems may be an exception to the general rule. It
may be possible for the municipality to enact a zoning or land use regulation in its police
power function and implement it through its management of the water system. See Con-
trol of Government Utility Extensions, supra note 24; Annot., 48 A.L.R.2d 1222 (1956).
See note 24 supra. For an argument that a municipally-owned water system functions
within the same parameters as do other water distributors, see note 76 infra.
59. See Gilgert v. Stockton Port Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 384, 60 P.2d 847 (1936), disap-
proved on other grounds, San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal.
3d 205,216, 529 P.2d 570, 577, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 153 (1974).
60. CAL. WATER CODB § 355 (West 1971).
61. See Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. Long Beach, 210 Cal. 348, 356, 291 P. 839,
843 (1930).
62. See New York Edison Co. v. Maltbie, 244 App. Div. 436, 442, 279 N.Y.S.
949,955 (1935).
63. See Faust v. Faust, 103 Cal. App. 2d 755,757, 230 P.2d 408, 409-10 (1951).
64. See CAL. WATER CODE § 355 (West 1971).
65. Bynum v. Miller, 89 N.C. 393, 395 (1883).
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effect only "until the supply of water . . . has been . . . augmented. '66
"Augmentation" denotes the act of increasing or making larger by
addition or expansion.67 Therefore it seems reasonable to conclude that
the distributor has a positive duty in these situations to take measures to
augment the water supply. To conclude otherwise would enable the
distributor to control the population growth in its territory indirectly
although it could not do so directly.
In summary, a water hookup moratorium may exist until the water
shortage emergency condition is abated by replenishment or augmenta-
tion of the water supply. Thus, although the water hookup moratorium
is deemed to be temporary, it may nevertheless continue for a long or
indefinite period of time in situtations in which drought persists or in
which it is impossible to augment the water supply despite a good faith
effort on the part of the distributor.
The Duty To Augment the Water Supply
No California appellate court has ever directly held 68 that a water
distributor has a positive duty to augment its water supply.6 9 Neverthe-
66. CAL. WATER CODE § 355 (West 1971).
67. Vejar v. Mound City Land & Water Ass'n, 97 Cal. 659, 663, 32 P. 713, 715
(1893) (emphasis added).
68. Nevertheless, the duty to augment supply is not a new concept. In a case
heard by the California Supreme Court shortly after the turn of the century, the court
noted in dictum: "The proper discharge of this public duty [to provide a water service]
required not only that the company should provide a supply of water and establish a
system for its distribution to meet the reasonable needs of the municipal community as
it then existed, but it was under the obligation to keep in view the prospective and prob-
able increase in population of the municipality and the necessarily increasing demand
for a water supply which would be consequent therefrom; to anticipate the natural
growth of the municipality it had undertaken to serve as a whole and to take reasonable
measures to have under its control a sufficient supply of water and make gradual exten-
sions of its distributive system to meet the reasonable demands for water by the growing
community." Lukrawka v. Spring Valley Water Co., 169 Cal. 318, 325, 146 P. 640,
643 (1915). The water distributor in Lukrawka did in fact control an adequate supply
of water to serve the plaintiffs. Id. at 322, 146 P. at 641-42. Thus, the dictum concern-
ing the duty to augment supply is not persuasive. Nevertheless, even if Lukrawka is
included, it can be stated that no California cases have directly held that a water supplier
has a positive duty to take reasonable measures to augment its supply. But cf. Auch-
moody v. Manhattan Beach, 53 Cal. App. 726, 200 P. 803 (1921). See also Leavitt
v. Lassen Irrigation Co., 157 Cal. 82, 106 P. 404 (1909).
Dictum similar to that in Lukrawka appears in a New Jersey Supreme Court case.
See Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township, 10 N.J. 229, 234, 89 A.2d 667,
669 (1952). But see Barney's Furniture Warehouse v. City of Newark, 62 N.J. 456,
469, 303 A.2d 76, 83 (1973).
69. One California case indicates that there is no duty to augment the water sup-
ply. See Wilson v. Hidden Valley Municipal Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d 271, 63
Cal. Rptr. 889 (1967). The plaintiffs in Wilson sought to have their undeveloped agri-
cultural land excluded from the defendant district's jurisdiction. In addition, the plain-
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less, it is submitted that such a duty does exist and that the satisfaction
of this duty is a requirement for the continuation of any valid water
hookup moratorium unless the shortage will be naturally replenished.
Thus, rather than adopting the Main County court's approach of
focusing on whether the water shortage is "actual" or "threatened,"
courts in future cases should focus on whether or not the distributor has
made a good faith effort to augment its supply. The rationale for this
suggestion is that a good faith effort to augment the water supply must
always be absent if the water hookup moratorium was declared solely to
implement a "no-growth" policy. In such a case, a court should invali-
date the moratorium and order the distributor to hook up water connec-
tions, assuming that the distributor controls an adequate supply. If the
supply is insufficient, the court should order the distributor to augment
its supply. On the other hand, a water distributor who has made and
continues to make a good faith effort to augment its supply should be
permitted to exercise discretion in managing the water system to the full
extent permitted by the Water Code.
The Existence of the Duty To Augment the Water Supply
The discussion above concerning the variables which determine the
permissible duration of a water hookup moratorium 70 is also relevant to
a discussion of the varying duties of a distributor who imposes a
moratorium. As previously mentioned, 71 a water hookup moratorium is
considered to be only a temporary emergency measure. The moratorium
may exist only until the supply has been "replenished or augmented."
tiffs sought the district's consent to the annexation of their land by the Metropolitan
Water District of Southern California.
The water district in Wilson was formed for the purpose of preventing water serv-
ice. The court noted in dictum: 'This district was quite evidently formed and has been
maintained to prevent the importation of Metropolitan Water District water into Hidden
Valley and the subdivision and urbanization of that Valley which the great majority of
people within the Valley feel would then inevitably occur. We see nothing wrong in
the use of a water district for this purpose .... By the exercise of their right of politi-
cal self-determination, [the people of Hidden Valley] thereby . . . regulate the kind of
land use that can prevail within the Valley." 256 Cal. App. 2d at 285, 63 Cal. Rptr.
at 897-98.
Nevertheless, the decision in Wilson was not based on the broad language quoted
above. Rather, the decision turned on the fact that municipal water districts, unlike
other water districts, are not "benefit districts," since the legislature failed to provide
that a benefit to the land, or a lack thereof, should be the determinative factor in an
exclusion proceeding. Id. at 282-84, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 895-97. It is suggested that the
Wilson case be strictly limited to its facts and that the dictum that indicates that a water
district has no duty to augment its supply and that a water district may be used to "reg-
ulate ... land use" be disapproved.
70. See notes 59-67 & accompanying text supra.
71. See notes 59-67 & accompanying text supra.
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The former term applies to a water supply which has been depleted
owing to abnormal meteorological conditions such as the lack of rain-
fall, while the latter term refers to a water supply which has been
depleted by excessive consumption. Thus, if a water shortage emergency
condition is created by subnormal rainfall, the water distributor may
declare a water hookup moratorium and passively await the return of
normal rainfall which will replenish its supply. On the other hand, a
water supply depleted by excessive consumption cannot be "replen-
ished," and therefore it must be "augmented." "Augmentation" implies
an active role on the part of the water distributor, and the term provides
the basis for finding an implicit duty to augment the water supply.
Moreover, the duty to augment the supply is not simply implicit in
the term "augmentation." This obligation also seems to follow as a
logical necessity from the general statutes relating to a water distributor.
A water distributor is formed for the express purpose of supplying
water, 2 and it is granted broad powers to accomplish its purpose.73
Nonetheless, the water distributor's powers do not include the police
power; therefore it cannot make zoning and land use planning deci-
sions.74 If there were no duty to augment supply, water distributors
could impose indefinite water hookup moratoria, which could provide
absolute veto power over development plans formulated by the proper
planning bodies. Not only would this unlimited power compound the
problems already faced by the planning bodies, but it would also con-
72. For example, the name "special purpose" district indicates that the district was
formed for the special purpose of providing water. In addition, some water districts
have a benefit standard for inclusion of land in the district by which land is not to be
included in the district unless it will be.benefited. In the formation of an irrigation
district, "[]and shall be excluded which will not . . . be benefited by the project." CAL.
WATER CODE § 20845 (West 1956). In forming a county water district "[n]o land
which will not . . . be benefited by the district shall be included." Id. § 30264. There
is no comparable provision, however, as to municipal water districts. See Wilson v. Hid-
den Valley Municipal Water Dist., 256 Cal. App. 2d 271, 282-84, 63 Cal. Rptr. 889,
895-97 (1967).
73. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE §§ 22075-78, 22425-37, 22455-58 (West 1956 &
Supp. 1975) (irrigation districts); d. §§ 31020-22, 31040-50 (county water districts);
id. §§ 71610, 71690-94 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975) (municipal water districts). See
notes 78-84 & accompanying text infra.
74. See Gilgert v. Stockton Port Dist., 7 Cal. 2d 384, 60 P.2d 847 (1936), disap-
proved on other grounds, San Diego Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. City Council, 13 Cal.
3d 205, 216, 529 P.2d 570, 577, 118 Cal. Rptr. 146, 153 (1974). A city's power to
make zoning and land use planning decisions derives from the home rule provision of
the California Constitution or the state zoning law. See CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7; CAL.
Gov'T CODE §§ 65800-912 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975). D. HAGMAN, J. LARSON & C.
MARTIN, CALIFORNIA ZONING PRACTICE § 4.1-.33 (1969 & Supp. 1975). See generally
8 CALIFORNIA REAL ESTATE LAW & PRACTICE, ZONING & LAND USE CONTROLS §§ 260.10,
260.13 (1974). See note 2 supra.
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stitute an invalid circumvention of the procedures established for the
enactment of land use regulations. 75
It is not suggested that a water distributor should completely
disregard planning criteria and growth projections in managing a water
system. Rather, it is simply argued that the water distributor is not the
proper body to formulate such criteria or projections. 70 Once such
planning decisions have been properly made, however, the water distrib-
utor has a duty to augment its supply in order to be able to serve the
predicted population.
The Water Code specifies the broad powers granted to the various
types of water distributors which enable them to augment their sup-
plies.77 Special purpose districts78 may make and perform contracts, 7
exercise the power of eminent domain, 0 and own property within or
outside their respective districts. 81 Municipalities are empowered by
statute to obtain water supplies for their residents.8 2 Private water
companies may perform any act necessary to carry out the powers
authorized by their articles of incorporation. 3 The powers of public
utilities are similar to those of private water companies, except that the
utilities are subject to regulation by the California Public Utilities Com-
mission."' The fact that these powers are granted by statute, however,
75. See note 74 supra.
76. Other commentators argue that a municipally-owned water system may exer-
cise discretion in extending its system in order to control growth. See Annot.,
48 A.L.R.2d 1222 (1956). See generally Control of Government Utility Extensions,
supra note 24. A closer analysis, however, reveals that a municipally-owned utility is
governed by similar restrictions. The confusion arises from the fact that the governing
board of a municipality wears two hats, a legislative police power hat when enacting
land use regulations and an administrative hat when managing the water system. It can-
not circumvent the procedures for the proper exercise of the police power through its
control of the water system. It can, however, use the water system as a necessary and
proper means of implementing a police power decision once such decision has been prop-
erly made. This procedure is essentially the same as that followed by other water dis-
tributors in making decisions to augment on the basis of growth forecasts of planning
departments.
77. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 22075 (West 1956) (irrigation districts); id.
§§ 31000-01 (county water districts); id. § 71592 (municipal water districts) (West
1966).
78. For a comparison of various types of water distributors, see note 24 supra.
79. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 22230 (West 1956) (irrigation districts); id.
§ 31004 (county water districts); id. § 71592 (West 1966) (municipal water districts).
80. See, e.g., id. § 22455 (West 1956) (irrigation districts); id. § 31044 (county
water districts); id. §§ 71693-94 (West 1966 & Supp. 1975) (municipal water districts).
81. See, e.g., id. § 22425 (West 1956 & Supp. 1975) (irrigation districts); id. §
31041 (West 1956) (county water districts); id. § 71690 (West 1966) (municipal water
districts).
82. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 38730 (West 1968).
83. See CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 301(b), 9300(b) (West Supp. 1975).
84. See, e.g., CAL. PUB. Ur-L. CODE § 1001 (West Supp. 1975).
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does not ensure that the distributor involved will be free to exercise
them. For example, voters85 in a special purpose district may consistent-
ly defeat bond proposals and proposed increases in the tax rate which
are needed to finance the improvements required to augment the water
supply. Since the courts will not order impossible acts, 6 the water
distributor in such a situation will be deemed to have satisfied its duty to
augment the supply if it has made a "sufficient effort. 8s7 What con-
stitutes a sufficient effort must necessarily be determined from the facts
and circumstances of each case. As a general proposition, however, the
water distributor must use whatever powers it has been granted, to the
extent such powers are available, in order to augment its supply. If such
powers have been exhausted, however, the duty is fulfilled." The fore-
going analysis could have been used by the Marin court.8 9 The court
noted that two previously unused methods of financing an augmentation
project were available to the Main Municipal Water District even
without voter approval.9" First, the district had adequate funds on hand
from the sale of a bond issue previously approved by the voters to
finance the construction of a planned aqueduct which would bring more
85. Voters become involved only when the water distributor is a special purpose
district. A municipally-owned water system is managed as any other municipal activity
is directed. See Hughes v. City of Lincoln, 232 Cal. App. 2d 741, 43 Cal. Rptr. 306
(1965) (chartered city may administer municipal water system with broad powers au-
thorized in charter). Private water companies serve only their own shareholders; as a
result, no voter action is involved in their operation. When a public utility is involved,
the Public Utilities Commission controls the decisionmaking. See CAL. PUB. UTIL.
CODE §§ 2708, 2710-11 (West 1956).
86. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3531 (West 1970); see Cozzens v. North Fork Ditch Co.,
2 Cal. App. 404, 84 P. 342 (1905) (petition for writ of mandate to compel new water
service was subject to demurrer if it did not allege respondent had sufficient water to
meet the increased demand).
87. Cf. Auchmoody v. Manhattan Beach, 53 Cal. App. 726, 200 P. 803 (1921).
88. Cf. id. In Auchmoody, a municipally-owned water system was unable to sup-
ply water to the plaintiff owing to a mechanical failure for which it was not at fault.
Nevertheless, the court found that the municipality did not make a "sufficient effort"
to conclude contract negotiations to obtain a substitute water supply from a neighboring
distributor. Id. at 731, 200 P. at 805. Therefore, the court held the municipality liable
for damages resulting from its failure to supply water. Id.
89. The court merely stated without elaboration that the water district had a duty
to augment its supply. McCarthy Co. v. Main Municipal Water Dist., No. 66519, at
12 (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974).
90. The court did not clearly articulate the role that these factors played in the
decision. The court found that a "threatened" water shortage was insufficient to author-
ize the distributor to impose a moratorium under Water Code sections 350-58. See notes
33-41 & accompanying text supra. The court also found that Water Code section 71640
did not authorize a moratorium under any circumstances. See notes 48-50 & accom-
panying text supra. Thus, the court's conclusions that there was a duty to augment the
water supply and that reasonable means of augmentation were available were not crucial
factors in the decision.
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water into the district's system.' Second, the Water Code gives a
municipal water district the power to increase water rates to establish a
reserve for capital improvements. 2 Thus, without doing violence to the
language contained in section 350, the court could have held that the
district had a duty to take reasonable measures to augment its supply,
that at least two reasonable measures were available, and that therefore
the district could not be said to have satisifed its duty to augment the
supply of water. 3
The Role of Rationing
A sufficient effort to augment requires that the distributor exhaust
not only all powers to increase the supply but also all powers to conserve
the existing supply. Since all distributors are empowered to conserve
water by rationing during periods of water shortage emergency, 4 a
rationing plan must be considered an essential element of a "sufficient
effort" to augment the water supply. 5 There are several grounds on
which this conclusion is based.
First, rationing water is consistent with the overall tenor of Division
One of the Water Code. Section 353, the enabling statute, provides:
91. McCarthy Co. v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 66519, at 12 (Marin
County, Cal. Super. CL, June 7, 1974).
92. Id.; CAL. WATER CODE § 71616 (West Supp. 1975).
93. The court stated that the construction time for the aqueduct was estimated to
be less than one year. McCarthy Co. v. Marin Municipal Water Dist., No. 66519, at
9 (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974). This period would have been the
maximum length of time that the moratorium could have remained in effect.
94. See CAL. WATER CODE § 353 (West 1971).
95. "Rationing," as used in this note, denotes a conservation measure by which
the wastage of water is reduced or eliminated. The "ration" could be the "normal house-
hold use" as the latter term may reasonably be defined by the water distributor.
Furthermore, rationing could be effectuated by a voluntary reduction in consumption as
well as by maximum allotments. Thus, the issue is not whether the distributor has en-
gaged in a specific form of rationing, but whether the distributor has taken reasonable
measures to conserve its supply in light of the facts and circumstances of the case. A
water rationing system could be enforced by a significant increase in the charge for the
use of water in excess of the rationed amount. The excess use charge would have two
effects. First, it would motivate individuals to conserve water in order to avoid the ex-
cess use charge. The "extra" water that is saved because of the decrease in water con-
sumption would lessen and possibly eliminate the threat of a water shortage condition,
thereby forestalling the necessity for the imposition of a water hookup moratorium.
Second, the receipts from the excess use charges could be earmarked for purposes of aug-
menting the water supply.
In addition, a reserve for capital improvements could be financed by an increase
in user rates. Currently only municipal water districts may set rates high enough to
generate such a reserve fund. See CAL. WATER CODE § 71616 (West Supp. 1975). The
legislature should extend this power to other special purpose districts, as well.
While certainly not an immediate solution to a water shortage crisis such a capital
improvement fund fed by excess use charges and increased rates should constitute a rea-
sonable effort to augment the water supply when all other methods have been exhausted.
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When the governing body has so determined and declared the exis-
tence of an emergency condition of water shortage within its service
area, it shall thereupon adopt such regulations and restrictions on
the delivery of water and the consumption within said area of water
supplied for public use as will in the sound discretion of such gov-
erning body conserve the water supply for the greatest public
benefit with particular regard to domestic use, sanitation, and fire
protection. 96
While certainly both rationing and hookup moratoria are restrictions on
the delivery and consumption of water, the two methods should not be
considered to be equally available remedies in a water shortage emer-
gency. Rationing is clearly the preferable method for dealing with a
shortage and thus should generally be imposed before a hookup morato-
rium is allowed to continue. The language of the enabling statute directs
this conclusion, since rationing is the measure which functions to con-
serve the water supply for the "greatest public benefit. '97 A moratorium
conserves water by ensuring that no additional conusmers make de-
mands on the water supply. Only the present consumers, however, are
benefited by such a plan. Rationing, on the other hand, reduces the
wastage of water, thereby conserving the supply, and at the same time
permits the distributor to include additional members of the public as
new water consumers. Thus, while both a moratorium and rationing
conserve the supply, rationing seems to impart the greater public bene-
fit.
This conclusion is reinforced by the next section of the statute,
which permits the water distributor to establish priorities in water use.
Section 354 provides:
After allocating and setting aside the amount of water which in
the opinion of the governing body will be necessary to supply water
needed for domestic use, sanitation, and fire protection, the regula-
tions may establish priorities in the use of water for other purposes
and provide for the allocation, distribution, and delivery of water
for such other purposes, without discrimination between consumers
using water for the same purpose or purposes.98
This section permits the water distributor to conserve the water supply
by allocating water among different types of users. It should be noted
that in both section 353 and section 354, domestic use is a preferred use
of water. The statutes do not distinguish between existing domestic use
and new domestic use. Section 354 states merely that the distributor
must first set aside the amount of water "needed for domestic use" and
may then establish priorites for the use of the remaining water. This
language provides further evidence that conservation of water by ration-
96. CAL. WATER CODE § 353 (West 1971) (emphasis added).
97. Id.
98. Id. § 354.
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ing, which in this instance takes the form of priorities of use, is a
necessary step in conserving the water supply.
Finally, section 356 provides that "[tihe regulations and restric-
tions may include the right to deny applications for new or additional
service connections . . ... 1 Although supporters of water hookup
moratoria might argue that this section authorizes the distributor to
declare a hookup moratorium immediately and to continue it through-
out periods of water shortage, it would seem more reasonable to follow
the chronology set forth in the previous statutes. Thus, as a first step in a
water shortage emergency, the distributor may place restrictions on the
delivery and consumption of water to the extent necessary to conserve
the water supply for the greatest public benefit. Since the distributor
must pay particular regard to domestic use, sanitation, and fire protec-
tion,' it may ration all users so that water will remain available for
these purposes. If a water shortage persists, the distributor may establish
priorities among types of users,' but again it must favor domestic use,
sanitation, and fire protection. 10 2 As a last resort, the distributor may
deny applications for new or additional service connections. 1 3 It is
further submitted that even when the distributor is allowed to refuse new
water hookups, this refusal should be applied according to the chronol-
ogy established by sections 353 and 354. Thus, domestic use should still
be considered a favored use. The denial of hookups for domestic use
should be permitted only as the last step in a series of actions designed
to conserve the water supply.
The priority of rationing is required to protect the rights of the
owners of undeveloped land to obtain water service in the distributor's
territory.' 0 4 If this priority were not observed, one homeowner might be
able to prevent his neighbor from building a home on a neighboring
undeveloped lot solely by wasting so much water that a water hookup
moratorium would be imposed. This example may not be as extreme as
it appears at first. If the residents of a community were sufficiently
intent on instituting a "no-growth" policy, it is not inconceivable that
they would realize that a concerted effort to waste water could result in
a water shortage and the imposition of a water hookup moratorium, an
effective impediment to any growth. To avoid such a result, water
99. Id. § 356.
100. See id. § 353.
101. See, e.g., Peters-Rhodes Co., 50 Cal. P.U.C. 586 (1951).
102. See CAL. WATER CODE § 354 (West 1971).
103. See id. § 356 (West 1971).
104. See Russell v. Sebastian, 233 U.S. 195, 208-09 (1914); Leavitt v. Lassen Irri-
gation Co., 157 Cal. 82, 89, 106 P. 404, 407 (1909); Arcade County Water Dist. v.
Arcade Fire Dist., 6 Cal. App. 3d 232, 238, 85 Cal. Rptr. 737, 740 (1970). See note
26 supra.
January 1976] WATER HOOKUP MORATORIA
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
conservation by rationing must be an essential step in the satisfaction of
the duty to augment.
Undoubtedly, those who oppose this view will argue that rationing
is too harsh a burden for the residents of the community to bear. Such
an argument is myopic. It must be recalled that rationing is likely to
become necessary only when a distributor has been unable to control an
adequate supply. This situation will normally occur only in special
purpose districts after bond proposals have been defeated by the vot-
ers1"' in the districts.' 0 6 If this voter action was motivated by valid fiscal
concerns, 11 7 it must be considered that the failure of the bond proposal
does not mean that the emergency is nonexistent. Therefore, rationing
might be not only justified but also necessary. On the other hand, if the
voter action was motivated solely by a desire to slow or stop population
growth, the voters must recognize that a water rationing system is the
price any community must pay if it wishes to slow its growth by means
of a water hookup moratorium. 10°
Finally, if a failure to ration were to result in the declaration of a
water hookup moratorium, such action would discriminate in favor of
present consumers and against prospective consumers. This form of
discrimination may violate the express provisions of the Water Code
which proscribe discrimination among similar users. 10 9 Even if failure to
ration does not violate the Water Code, it would seem to be more
equitable in an emergency condition to impose rationing on each of
these groups in a like manner rather than to deprive prospective consum-
ers for the benefit of present consumers.
105. See note 85 supra.
106. Rationing may also become necessary in a public utility's territory if the Pub-
lic Utilities Commission issues an order prohibiting the addition of new consumers. See
CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 2708, 2710-11 (West 1956). A municipally-owned water
system's refusal to augment might be justified as an implementation of a police power
regulation. See note 76 supra. A failure to augment due to oversight or incompetent
management, however, may create a situation in which rationing is required. A plivate
water company does not serve the public. Rather it serves only its own shareholders.
See note 24 supra. Thus, a private water company will not be required to ration before
it can refuse to take on new consumers. Of course a private water company, like all
distributors, must ration a limited supply among current users during periods of a present
water shortage. See Butte County Water Users Ass'n v. Railroad Comm'n, 185 Cal.
218, 225, 196 P. 265, 267 (1921); CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2711 (West 1956).
107. Voter action may be motivated by the exorbitant expense of importing water.
108. "Rationing" as defined in this note is not a heavy burden in any event. See
note 95 supra. For still less onerous means of slowing growth, see Construction Indus.
Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975).
109. CAL. WATER CODE § 354 (West 1971). See McCarthy Co. v. Main Munici-
pal Water D;st., No. 66519, at 13 (Marin County, Cal. Super. Ct., June 7, 1974).
See also Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437 F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971) (racial discrimina-
tion in provision of utility service); Reid Dev. Corp. v. Parsippany-Troy Hills Township,
10 N.J. 229, 89 A.2d 667 (1952).
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Thus, the water distributor's duty to augment its water supply
includes the duty to attempt to conserve the supply by water rationing. If
the water distributor has made a good faith effort to satisfy the duty to
augment by exhausting all its statutory powers, and a water shortage still
exists, then a water hookup moratorium is justified and may continue as
long as the shortage persists. Under some circumstances, then, a morato-
rium is inevitable. As Judge Trapp observed in his Intended Ruling on
the Demurrer and Motion To Strike in Pomatto v. Goleta County Water
District:
I think we must all agree that at some point in time the search for
additional water sources must come to a halt despite the utmost
good faith of the [water distributor] in seeking such additional water
sources. The term "reasonable" certainly includes the concept
of practicality. The Pacific Ocean is not very far away but it would
seem neither reasonable nor practical to construct a desaliniza-
tion plant at a cost of fifty million dollars, if it could even be done
for that. The fact remains that in our part of California . . . we
eventually must run out of water and, consequently, stop further
growth. 10
Conclusion-An Analytical Model
An analysis of the validity of any given water hookup moratorium
should address three basic questions:11'
1. Does the water distributor control an adequate supply to provide the
service?lla
A water distributor cannot be compelled to provide water to new
users if it does not control a sufficient supply. The existence of a water
shortage emergency or the threat of such an emergency is sufficient to
justify the temporary imposition by the distributor of a water hookup
moratorium. At this point, the issue becomes one of determining the
permissible duration of the moratorium.
2. Is the water shortage or threat of water shortage the result of
subnormal rainfall or similar manifestations of a dry cycle?" 3
110. Notice of Intended Ruling on Demurrer and Motion To Strike, Apr. 11, 1974,
Pomatto v. Goleta County Water Dist., No. 101404 (Santa Barbara, Cal. Super. Ct.,
filed Oct. 26, 1973).
111. Actually, there is an additional preliminary question: Is the demand reason-
able?
As a general rule, an inhabitant of the distributor's territory has a right to demand
that the water distributor supply him with water. Early California cases recognized that
it would be unreasonable to force a water distributor to make a large capital expenditure
to extend its water service to an isolated part of its territory. In a modern context, this
exception to the general rule applies to a new subdivision located in a remote area. See
note 26 supra.
112. See notes 22-57 & accompanying text supra.
113. See notes 58-65 & accompanying text supra.
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If the water shortage is due to a dry cycle or similar circumstances,
the water hookup moratorium may exist until the supply is naturally
replenished.
3. Is the water shortage or threat of water shortage the result of
increased consumption?"'
A water shortage caused by increased consumption due to
increased per capita use or to population growth triggers a duty on the
part of the water distributor to augment its supply and to conserve what
water resources it has. A water hookup moratorium may remain in
effect for a period necessary to allow the water distributor to make a
good faith effort to augment its supply by methods which involve the
imposition of conservation measures including water rationing. Only
when the distributor has exhausted all available means of augmenting
and conserving its water supply will the duty to augment the supply be
deemed to have been fulfilled. At that point the water hookup morato-
rium may be allowed to exist as long as the shortage continues."'
Richard M. Golden*
114. See notes 66-111 & accompanying text supra.
115. For example, when an improvement is completed, the analysis of the validity
of the water moratorium should once more focus on whether the water distributor con-
trols an adequate supply to provide the service. See text accompanying note 112 supra.
* Member, Third Year Class.
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